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THE SOVIET WORLD

There have been growing indications in the Soviet Union that N. S. Khrushchev's rising prestige may upset the current concept of collective leadership. During the past week Khrushchev has received a degree of personal publicity unprecedented since the inauguration of the collectivity principle just after Stalin's death.

On 19 May, the Kazakh press and regional radio carried a full report of Khrushchev's inspection trip to Kazakhstan, and Pravda printed a speech by B. P. Beshchev, minister of rail transport, containing a twelve-line quotation from Khrushchev's speech to the February-March Central Committee plenum. In addition, Pravda printed a speech by Kaganovich which included references to the Supreme Soviet speeches of Malenkov and Khrushchev, but, contrary to customary protocol, Khrushchev was mentioned first.

During his speech at the 22 May Ukrainian Supreme Soviet session commemorating the 300th anniversary of the reunification of the Ukraine with Russia, Kirichenko included Khrushchev--but not Malenkov--in a brief list of "loyal disciples and comrades-in-arms of V. I. Lenin" who participated in the formation of the Soviet Ukraine. Later he gave a laudatory account of Khrushchev's work as first secretary of the Ukrainian party from 1938 to 1949. In addition, the delegates to the meeting from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan both went out of their way to laud Khrushchev, whose name was greeted by applause each time it was mentioned.

This tribute receives added significance in light of the fact that Malenkov's name is not mentioned once in any available account of the celebration. The increasing public prestige and actual influence of Khrushchev is contrary to the concept of collectivity and reflects adversely on Malenkov's status as head of party and state. While there is as yet no firm evidence of struggle, there have been hints of differences between the two leaders on certain internal issues. It would be logical to expect some move by Malenkov in the near future to counter this trend. Its continuation could only suggest that Khrushchev's position and influence is greater than Malenkov's.

At the Geneva conference, the Communist position on the relationship between a cease-fire and a political settlement in Indochina is still obscure. After beginning with the contention that the two questions are inseparable, the Communists began to retreat toward the possibility of an armistice first. They are currently insisting once more on the inseparability of military and political questions.

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Molotov, in his major speech of 14 May, explicitly rejected an armistice along the lines of the French proposal on the grounds that Bidault's formula did not deal with political problems. However, Molotov's formulation--that it would be impossible to separate the termination of the war from the solution of "at least some" political problems--made possible serious cease-fire negotiations without complete agreement on a political settlement.

Chou En-lai told Eden in private conversation on 20 May that the military and political aspects of any Indochina settlement must be dealt with separately, with priority for a cease-fire, and that there might be three different political settlements for the three Associated States.

In the restricted Indochina session on 25 May, the Communists took a harder line. Both Molotov and Chou En-lai again insisted on the inseparability of military and political questions, and both, backed by the Viet Minh delegate, urged alternate meetings on military and political problems.

Under Secretary Smith reported after the 25 May meeting that the Communists seemed concerned over the trend toward discussing military before political matters and were trying to recover lost ground. The under secretary believed that the Communists' tactics in the 25 May meeting discouraged the hope that they might permit substantive discussion on military matters to proceed without simultaneously injecting political issues. He concluded that the Communists were still playing for time on the premise that time is on their side in Indochina.

At the disarmament talks in London, Soviet delegate Malik apparently hopes to create a situation whereby the onus for the failure of the talks ultimately can be placed on the United States. In regard to Western proposals, Malik told the subcommittee that there was nothing more to discuss since there had been no change in the American position. He insisted that the Western position is based on the Baruch plan, which is unacceptable to the USSR. He demanded that the subcommittee turn its attention, instead, to the Soviet proposals for an immediate prohibition of nuclear weapons and a one-third reduction of conventional arms.

The demand for a Soviet-style prohibition will apparently be the main theme at the current meetings of the World Peace Council in Berlin where a bevy of pro-Soviet scientists are scheduled to play leading roles. [redacted]

[redacted] the current session of the council will launch the "Berlin appeal for the prohibition of A and H bombs," which will receive propaganda exploitation comparable to the Stockholm appeal and, like the latter, will serve as a basis for a world-wide collection of signatures.

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LANIEL BACKS FURTHER MILITARY EFFORT IN INDOCHINA

Premier Laniel, still under considerable pressure from the French National Assembly to explore every possibility for an Indochina settlement at Geneva, is taking steps to forestall military disaster. The reinforcements now en route to Tonkin were sent for this reason, but also because Laniel probably hoped their dispatch would strengthen France's position at Geneva and encourage early American participation in the war. Most of the cabinet and the National Assembly, however, still oppose any internationalization of the war.

Following the vote of confidence on 13 May, Laniel called a meeting of the High Council of National Defense to consider "Draconian measures." On 18 May, the council dispatched three top generals to Indochina on a fact-finding mission. It also decided to send 30,000 reinforcements to Indochina should General Ely recommend such action on his return.

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A spokesman for Secretary for the Associated States Jacquet told American officials in Paris on 20 May that a Foreign Legion parachute battalion was already on its way to Indochina, and that about 5,000 additional men were being processed in North Africa. In addition, a plan is now under study to advance to June the call-up of the October conscript class in order to release regulars for service in Indochina.

The government hopes to convince the National Assembly that further military reinforcements are needed to protect the expeditionary force by strengthening the defenses of the Tonkin delta. It is also anxious to remove the impression that the fall of Dien Bien Phu broke the back of the French military effort.

The increased military effort now planned is only a stopgap measure, however, and not an alternative to foreign intervention or a cessation of hostilities. General Ely told General O'Daniel in Saigon on 18 May, "The sooner you get into the war, the better we will like it." He said that

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he accepted the concept of American training for the Vietnamese National Army, but he refused to concede the need for American participation in operational planning.

While most French military leaders and some cabinet members continue to urge American intervention, a majority of the cabinet and of assembly deputies profess to see such a move as the first step to a generalized war. The assembly made it clear in the two votes of confidence in the past three weeks that it expects the government to bring the war to an end through negotiations at Geneva. On 25 May it put further pressure on Laniel by voting 385-231 in favor of holding a full-scale Indochina debate on 1 June, immediately following the Ascension Day recess.

Laniel will probably face severe questioning when he requests the additional funds needed for Indochina. In particular, government efforts to enter into a Southeast Asian alliance with the United States, but without Britain, will evoke sharp attack.

Until it is absolutely clear that Geneva has failed, there is little chance of the assembly accepting a policy hostile to the climate of negotiation. On the contrary, the continuing pressure for a settlement has severely restricted Foreign Minister Bidault at Geneva. He has expressed fears of domestic reaction to his inflexibility in maintaining his original position on the minimum terms acceptable for a cease-fire, and even his own party is reported critical of his stand. [redacted]

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Even if the assembly accepts Laniel's reinforcement program as a means to save the delta, or to facilitate possible evacuation, the deputies are unlikely to be diverted from their increasing determination to rid France of the war burden.

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**WEST GERMAN AGITATION FOR ORBIT RELATIONS
REFLECTS PESSIMISM ON EDC**

The controversy in West Germany over establishing relations with the Orbit is symptomatic mainly of growing pessimism regarding European integration. Certain politicians, fearing that French failure to ratify EDC will make Chancellor Adenauer's foreign policy a political liability in the coming state elections, have pressed the issue recently in a search for a new line with voter appeal. Bonn government leaders, however, continue to regard the question of diplomatic relations as premature.

The debate seems to have arisen largely by accident. In April Karl Georg Pfleiderer, a Bundestag deputy of the Free Democratic Party (FDP)--one of the coalition parties--began pushing a proposal that a group of Bundestag members should visit Moscow to improve cultural and economic relations. They would return to work for diplomatic relations "when the time came." Pfleiderer has been described by his party leader, Thomas Dehler, as "speaking for himself," and for a while this proposal drew little notice. On 7 May, however, Adenauer was interviewed by newsmen in Hamburg on the locally important topic of expanding trade with the Orbit and was asked whether normal trade relations with Moscow and Peiping would be followed by diplomatic relations. His answer, "Very possibly," was later explained by the chancellery as intentionally evasive, and was regarded by the American high commission as noncommittal.

This was reported by the German press in such a way that it appeared Adenauer would soon seek diplomatic relations. With this encouragement, and with intensified activity by Pfleiderer, various cabinet members and some other coalition leaders hastily endorsed the idea of political contacts with the Orbit. Several influential newspapers added their endorsement, linking the issue to reports that a West German trade delegation would go to Moscow in June.

The prospect of relations with the Orbit appeals to those politicians not wedded to Adenauer's European integration policies. First, it has the advantage of renewing hope for German unification; second, it offers the possibility of increased trade; and third, it promises to give the Federal Republic normal diplomatic standing among the world's powers.

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Serious obstacles lie in the way of such relations, however, and Adenauer intervened personally to discourage Dehler and the FDP executive board from sanctioning Pfleiderer's trip. The chancellor warned against "breaking step with the West" at a critical moment for Europe. When the FDP disregarded his wishes, he charged that the party was jeopardizing Germany's alliance with the West.

The greatest obstacle to the establishment of Bonn-Moscow diplomatic relations lies in the fact that under the revised occupation statute, the Federal Republic is not at liberty to establish Orbit relations without the Allied High Commission's approval.

A potential obstacle is the possibility that the Soviet Union would insist on Bonn's recognition of East Germany in return for Bonn-Moscow relations. Few West German politicians are presently prepared to agree to such terms.

By 19 May, Dehler was preparing to drop the Pfleiderer plan as gracefully as he could, in view of the strong and growing sentiment against it. Opposition to the proposed trip of a Bundestag delegation to Moscow does not, however, necessarily extend to the principle of increasing West Germany's contacts with the Orbit. The FDP and the other minor coalition parties may attempt to exploit the Orbit relations issue in the state campaigns this year, though it is improbable that they will win many votes away from the Christian Democrats thereby.

In any event, the issue of Bonn-Moscow relations is "here to stay," according to Ambassador Conant, since there is no doubt that eventually the West Germans will want normal relations whether or not the contractual agreements come into effect. The present controversy, by arousing some coalition leaders from their passivity, has already made it harder for Adenauer to hold support for his integration policies. Adenauer himself recently warned that in the absence of definite progress toward EDC, he will be forced within a few months to modify his present policies.

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RECENT SOVIET TACTICS IN AUSTRIA

The Soviet high commissioner's scathing rebuke to the Austrian government on 17 May marked a low point in Soviet-Austrian relations, which have deteriorated steadily since the Berlin conference. The rebuke seems to have been motivated primarily by the Kremlin's ever-present concern over real or imagined threats to its security, stimulated by what it regards as Western anti-Soviet activity and Vienna's growing spirit of independence. In spite of this concern, however, Moscow is unlikely to take measures which would result in a crisis of major proportions in Austria.

In a continuing atmosphere of Austrian frustration over the results of the Berlin conference, a series of incidents between Soviet and Austrian authorities on both the local and national levels led up to this Soviet action. On 15 March Soviet high commissioner Ilychev called on Interior Minister Helmer and demanded the removal of a People's Party election poster on display throughout Austria which caricatured Foreign Minister Molotov and criticized his veto of the Austrian state treaty. Chancellor Raab and the Austrian cabinet backed Helmer's order to local Austrian police to resist all pressure from the Soviet kommandaturas for the removal of the posters.

During March and April, the Communist press and radio continued their propaganda against alleged plans for an Anschluss with West Germany and attacked any Austrian development which could be interpreted as furthering the country's association with Germany or with the West. Soviet representatives in the Allied Council meeting of 30 April vetoed the accession of Austria to the Geneva convention on the status of refugees, and an ordinance by the Ministry of Interior abolishing visas for Western European nationals including West Germans. The USSR also emphatically refused to permit any Austrian civil air activities.

Soviet propaganda has also suggested an extreme sensitivity to any plans for training the Austrian gendarmerie as a cadre for future defense forces. There have been several reports of Soviet officers hinting to Austrian officials that their future plans for a defense force are known to the USSR.

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Soviet authorities have been particularly sensitive to the appearance, in areas of troop concentration, of Russian-language pamphlets calling on soldiers to desert from the Soviet army. On 2 April the Soviet high commissioner strongly protested the distribution of the leaflets and warned that local Austrian police would be held responsible if they continued to appear.

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It is possible that the increasing Soviet toughness in Austria foreshadows a new shift in Soviet tactics generally. Still, the harder and more confident tone of recent propaganda has not as yet been accompanied by corollary action elsewhere in Europe. While the Kremlin may be inclined to safeguard its security by re-establishing border controls in Austria, Soviet authorities do not appear to have taken any steps in preparation for such action.

It would appear, then, that local considerations played a major role in the Soviet denunciation of the Austrian government. Moscow's sensitivity to its security interests is buttressed by a growing pique at Austria's switch from a desire for quiet bilateral negotiations with the USSR to an openly hostile attitude.

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COMMUNIST POTENTIAL IN BURMA NOT YET FULLY DEVELOPED

Communist China has not yet fully exploited its opportunities for supporting various Communist and other insurgent elements in Burma. A more determined program may await the development of insurgent unity and establishment by the Burmese Communists of a firm rear base area near the Yunnan border.

The Soviet embassy in Rangoon has engaged in extensive overt propaganda activities but appears not to have pursued an active role in support of dissident elements. This latter function has been primarily discharged by Peiping which, in apparent recognition of the ethnic diversity of the population, has a varied program in Burma.

Reports from the Yunnan border area indicate extensive Chinese Communist propaganda and recruiting activities among the Kachin, Lisu, Shan and Wa peoples, many of whom are resentful of Rangoon's Burmanization policies. Useful focal points for these activities exist on the Yunnan side of the border, where Peiping has created several "autonomous areas" for peoples ethnically similar to those in Burma.

A Kachin "liberation force" under the leadership of the Burmese Kachin renegade, Naw Seng, was reportedly organized in China several years ago and is said to number about 1,500 men. A Rangoon newspaper recently reported that the Burmese Communists, aided by Chinese Communist agents, are planning a conference in north Burma designed to enlist Kachin support. Indian Communists from Assam were also to participate in the conference.

In Rangoon, the Chinese Communist embassy is active on many fronts. In its efforts to gain control of Burma's Chinese community of 350,000, it has placed special emphasis on the subversion of youth and has succeeded in bringing the majority of Chinese schools under Communist control. It extends its influence among Chinese merchants by means of politically conditioned loans from the Rangoon branch of the Bank of China. In addition, the embassy is reportedly subsidizing the Burma Workers and Peasants Party, a Communist-front group that has skillfully exploited such local explosive issues as the presence of Chinese Nationalists in the country to embarrass the government.

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The Burmese Communist Party, with an estimated armed following of 5,000, loosely controls several areas of central and south Burma. Despite military reverses during the past two years, Communist surrenders to the government are considerably less than from other insurgent groups. Since 1952, the Burmese Communists have pursued a dual strategy of military attacks against government outposts and lines of communications, and political overtures designed to obtain a cease-fire and the creation of a coalition government.

Peiping's direct aid to the Burmese Communists is believed thus far to have been restricted to the training of selected cadres in China. More substantial Chinese aid, in the form of arms and other military supplies, has probably been precluded by the remoteness of the Communists' main centers of strength from the Yunnan border.

The disunity of the various insurgents may be another factor operating to limit Peiping's aid to the Burmese Communist Party. In an attempt to remedy this condition, the party in 1952 organized a "tripartite alliance" with another pro-Communist insurgent organization known as the Peoples Comrades Party. The Communists have also sought to win over non-Communist ethnic minority insurgents, particularly the Karens, and there has been limited local co-operation between the Communists and the Karens in the Irrawaddy delta.

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EGYPTIAN REGIME MOVES TO CONSOLIDATE ITS POSITION

The Egyptian Revolutionary Command Council's recent moves to consolidate its position, following its success over General Nagib and the elements demanding a return to parliamentary life, will have an immediate stabilizing effect. In the long term, however, these actions will accentuate the weaknesses of the military group, especially if no progress is made on the Suez issue.

Since reasserting their absolute authority on 29 March, Colonel Nasr and the Council have set about neutralizing those factions which opposed them during the March crisis. In a series of measures, the regime barred from politics or office any individual who held cabinet rank during the past ten years; arrested 25 army officers; reportedly prohibited all officers from engaging in political activities or discussion; canceled the license and stopped publication of the antiregime newspaper Al Misri--the largest daily in the Arab world; and dissolved the Cairo Chamber of Commerce.

The isolation resulting from these measures, which have narrowed the popular base on which the regime can depend for support, constitutes a major threat to the Revolutionary Command Council. Domination of all aspects of political and economic life by young and inexperienced officers lessens the prospects for successful implementation of the much publicized reform and development projects promised by the Nasr group.

The ban on former cabinet officials deprives the Command Council of the assistance of virtually all experienced and competent top-level administrators and advisers--a loss the regime can ill afford. Efforts by the Nasr group to extend its influence over both labor unions and the chambers of commerce and to manipulate them for political purposes is likely to create further dissension.

The regime's summary action in convicting the owners of the powerful Al Misri and confiscating their property, and its attempts to subjugate other antiregime papers, may be expected to have repercussions among politically articulate sections and result in increased clandestine activities by opposition groups.

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The measures against Al Misri have already given the regime an unfavorable foreign press, particularly in Lebanon and Syria where relations have become strained over the incident. If other Arab states should disavow Egypt's claim to leadership, the Command Council would suffer a serious psychological setback which would increase its internal problems.

Lacking any substitute for General Nagib's personal appeal, the Revolutionary Command Council has sought in its speeches to belabor the evils of parliamentary government and to attribute to it all the economic ills of the past. At the same time the Nasr group has been promising early benefits from grandiose projects which have yet to be implemented. Such a policy represents a calculated risk on the part of the regime, the long-term dangers of which are apparent.

Since Nasr and the Revolutionary Command Council depend ultimately on the support of the army to remain in power, any action likely to affect the loyalty of an important faction of the armed forces is significant. The arrest of additional officers and the attempt to prevent army officers from participating in politics are likely in the long run to further dissension and antiregime sentiment.

Unless the Nasr group can obtain an early settlement on the Suez base which it can then present as a major political victory, the regime may find that the recent efforts to strengthen its position have in fact served to unify the opposition.

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